Editing Lourens Schroeter (father) (section)

== Second World War ==

The 26. Infanterie-Division mobilised in August 1939 and was deployed on Germany's western frontier. Schroeter remained with the formation through the opening months of the [[Second World War]] and was promoted to Oberst in early 1940.

During the German offensive in the west, he accompanied the division through Luxembourg and France. On 9 June 1940, fighting around Voncq on the Aisne caused an infantry crossing to become congested while French counterattacks were under way. Schroeter went forward and reorganised movement across the available routes. He also pushed engineering support and heavy weapons toward the troops on the opposite side. His conduct during the action was later cited in support of his promotion.

Schroeter became Generalmajor on 1 February 1941 and was assigned to Höheres Kommando z.b.V. LX in Normandy. He inspected infantry units in the western Cotentin and became critical of reserve formations that were positioned too far inland. An anti-landing exercise showed that part of the reserve could not reach the threatened coast quickly enough. Following an argument over the results, the local deployment plan was changed.

His promotion to Generalleutnant took effect on 1 March 1942. Later that year he was transferred to duties under OB West and Heeresgruppe D.

After the Allied raid on Dieppe in August 1942, Schroeter examined how the German defence had responded. He considered the decision to hold mobile reserves back until the main danger became clear to have been correct. His report called for reserve units to have predetermined movement routes and for coastal commands to communicate more quickly during an attack.

Schroeter was promoted to General der Infanterie in October 1942. He later commanded the temporary Gruppe Schroeter under [[15. Armee]]. The formation coordinated mobile infantry reserves behind the fixed coastal sectors without replacing the corps already responsible for the coastline.

[[Martinus Antonius Johannes Paap]] became commander of 15. Armee on 20 March 1943.<ref name="martinus-higher-command"/> Schroeter served under him as a senior inspector and adviser. During inspections he found that a number of static formations could hold prepared positions but performed poorly once forced to fight away from them. With Paap's approval, units judged deficient were taken out of bunker duty for repeated field exercises and movement training.

Schroeter and Paap became friends during their work in France. They argued regularly but shared similar views on the need to retain mobile forces behind the coast.

When [[Erwin Rommel]] became involved in the strengthening of the western defences, Schroeter disagreed with his preference for placing reserves close enough to the beaches to counterattack immediately. Schroeter continued to favour keeping a substantial mobile force farther inland until the main Allied landing had been identified.

When the [[Normandy landings]] began on 6 June 1944, Schroeter initially believed that Normandy might be a diversion and that a larger landing could still take place in the Pas-de-Calais. Paap believed from the beginning that Normandy was the main invasion and requested that formations be released from his sector.<ref name="martinus-higher-command"/> By around 20 June, Schroeter had accepted that the Normandy lodgement was the principal Allied operation.

Late that month, Schroeter was sent into Normandy to determine whether depleted German formations could still move, receive supplies and fight effectively under Allied air attack. He regarded Allied air superiority as the most immediate operational problem. He pushed transport into the hours of darkness and ordered vehicles to move in smaller groups, using concealed halts and alternate roads where possible.

Paap took command of [[7. Armee]] on 28 June.<ref name="martinus-normandy"/> Schroeter's work in Normandy continued under his authority.

By July, prolonged exhaustion and the condition of the German forces had begun to affect Schroeter's behaviour. During a telephone call with Paap, he described the formations around him as "a pair of broken bones" and complained that "even the Italians fortified better". The second remark was made during an angry argument about the failure to establish a stronger defence after the Allied breakout from the beaches.

Paap responded by giving Schroeter a special assignment dealing with combat readiness and movement discipline rather than giving him permanent command of a division or corps. Schroeter moved between sectors and imposed immediate changes where he found units unable to move or reorganise themselves.

During one incident in July, he found a large supply and reinforcement column preparing to travel during daylight. Schroeter stopped the movement, broke the column into smaller groups and had the vehicles placed under local cover until they could move more safely. Allied aircraft appeared over the area later that day. Complaints about his treatment of the transport officers reached Paap, who privately warned him to stop publicly humiliating officers and threatening their removal without headquarters approval.

After [[Operation Cobra]] began on 25 July, Schroeter was temporarily given authority over badly depleted forces on the Coutances–Avranches axis. He used whatever troops were still available around the road network to establish temporary blocking positions while other German units withdrew.

Around the end of July, Schroeter encountered a battalion retreating along the Coutances–Avranches road. He stopped it with vehicles from his own staff, forced the officers to establish how many men and weapons remained, and reorganised the survivors before sending them back into a temporary defensive position. The battalion broke again under American pressure. Schroeter attempted to reorganise it a second time until Paap ordered him to stop committing the exhausted troops simply because he was angry that they had withdrawn.

In early August, Paap tried to remove Schroeter from direct field command and return him to inspection work. Schroeter refused the order. Paap travelled to his headquarters and confronted him personally, after which Schroeter was allowed to remain near the front but lost independent command authority.

During the retreat from the Falaise area toward the Seine, Schroeter found troops abandoning usable transport and guns before the road had become impassable. He ordered equipment that could still be moved to be recovered and the remainder disabled. When an officer argued that the recovery effort was too dangerous because of Allied aircraft, Schroeter struck him. Members of his staff separated the two men.

Paap did not seek a court-martial. He removed Schroeter from 7. Armee and cited his exhaustion when the incident was reported.

Schroeter was subsequently placed in the Führerreserve. When another active assignment was proposed in September 1944, he refused it and requested release from service. A medical examination recorded serious spinal disease in addition to his exhaustion. He had degenerative lumbar spondylosis with lumbar spinal stenosis, which by then caused a permanent limp and made prolonged standing difficult.

Schroeter remained in the Führerreserve for the rest of the year and was formally discharged from active military service on 31 December 1944.